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Abstract
Finding the infection sources in a network when we only know the network topology and infected
nodes, but not the rates of infection, is a challenging combinatorial problem, and it is even more difficult
in practice where the underlying infection spreading model is usually unknown a priori. In this paper,
we are interested in finding a source estimator that is applicable to various spreading models, includ-
ing the Susceptible-Infected (SI), Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR), Susceptible-Infected-Recovered-
Infected (SIRI), and Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible (SIS) models. We show that under the SI, SIR and
SIRI spreading models and with mild technical assumptions, the Jordan center is the infection source
associated with the most likely infection path in a tree network with a single infection source. This
conclusion applies for a wide range of spreading parameters, while it holds for regular trees under the
SIS model with homogeneous infection and recovery rates. Since the Jordan center does not depend on
the infection, recovery and reinfection rates, it can be regarded as a universal source estimator. We also
consider the case where there are k > 1 infection sources, generalize the Jordan center definition to a
k-Jordan center set, and show that this is an optimal infection source set estimator in a tree network for
the SI model. Simulation results on various general synthetic networks and real world networks suggest
that Jordan center-based estimators consistently outperform the betweenness, closeness, distance, degree,
eigenvector, and pagerank centrality based heuristics, even if the network is not a tree.
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I. INTRODUCTION
We define an infection to be a property that can be spread probabilistically from one node to another
in a network. Examples of infection spreading include a rumor or a piece of news spreading in a social
network, a contagious disease spreading in a community, and a computer virus spreading on the Internet.
Various models have been developed to describe the spreading process of an infection. In this paper, we
consider only discrete time stochastic spreading models. The two simplest models are the Susceptible-
Infected (SI) model [1]–[4] and the Susceptible-Infected-Recovered (SIR) model [5], [6]. In the SI model,
a susceptible node becomes infected probabilistically at each time step, while an infected node retains
the infection forever once it is infected. In the SIR model, an infected node can recover from an infection
with a given probability at each time step, upon which it gains immunity from further infections.
With increasing interconnectedness of the world, both physically and online, prompt identification and
isolation of infection sources is crucial in many practical applications in limiting the damage caused
by the infection, and dealing with the aftermath effectively. Therefore, the problem of infection sources
estimation has attracted immense interest from the research community after the pioneering work of [7],
which investigates the problem of identifying a single infection source in the SI model. The reference
[8] considers single source estimation with a priori knowledge of the set of suspect nodes, while [9]
investigates the use of multiple infection spreading instances to identify a source. These methods are
based on variants of the distance or rumor centrality of the network graph. We have also developed
procedures to identify a source with limited observations of the set of infected nodes [10], and to identify
multiple infection sources in [11]. All these works adopt the SI model. Identification of a single infection
source in the SIR model was considered in [12], [13], which showed that the Jordan center1 gives the
optimal estimator associated with a most likely infection path. Infection source estimators using a dynamic
message passing (DMP) approach [14], and the belief propagation (BP) approach [15] have also been
developed for the SIR model. These two approaches however require significant a priori knowledge of
the infection spreading process like the infection and recovery rates of each node in the network.
The SI and SIR models have been widely adopted in the literature due to their simplicity, but these
models do not adequately reflect many practical situations in which an infected node recovers and becomes
1The Jordan center of the infected node set is the node in the network with the smallest maximum distance to any observed
infected node.
3infected again at some future time through either a relapse or reinfection. If an individual recovers from a
disease such as bovine tuberculosis or human herpes virus, he may later experience a relapse and exhibit
infection symptoms again [16]–[19]. The spread of such diseases are often modeled using a Susceptible-
Infected-Recovered-Infected (SIRI) model [17]–[19]. On the other hand, if an individual recovers from
a disease such as gonorrhea [20], he does not acquire any immunity from his previous infection and
may later become reinfected with the same disease. These types of diseases are often modeled using
a Susceptible-Infected-Susceptible (SIS) model [21]–[23]. A further example of SIRI and SIS type of
infection spreading is rumor spreading in an online social network, as monitored by an external agency
that does not have access to the full database of the social network. An individual in the network may
post a rumor, remove it, and repost the rumor subsequently. If the external agency only has access to a
limited set of the most recent postings of each user (for example, due to storage constraints), then trying
to identify the source of the rumor based purely on the time-stamps of the rumor posts will lead to an
erroneous result.
To the best of our knowledge, finding infection sources under the SIRI and SIS models have not been
investigated. Moreover, all the existing works assume that the underlying infection spreading model is
known, and in most cases, the infection and recovery rates of each node are also known. This knowledge
may be difficult to obtain in practice. For example, when a new type of infectious disease breaks out, the
spreading characteristics of the disease is usually unclear before its epidemiology is determined. Therefore,
it would be highly desirable if a source estimator can be shown to be robust, under a reasonable non-trivial
statistical criterion, to the underlying spreading mechanism, and universal to a wide range of parameters
governing the spreading process. Indeed, it is unclear that such an estimator even exists for the SI, SIR,
SIRI and SIS models.
In this paper, we adopt the most likely infection path (MLIP) criterion of [10], [12] to find the optimal
infection source estimator. Finding optimal source estimators is in general NP-hard, and proving the
optimality of an estimator is also in general very challenging, with similar results in the current literature
restricted to tree networks and the SI or SIR spreading models [7], [10], [12], [13]. Therefore, any hope
of obtaining theoretical optimality guarantees is restricted to special classes of networks. Our work is
a small step towards finding optimal source estimators for the more general SIRI and SIS models. Our
main contributions are the following:
4(i) For an infection spreading from a single source under the SI, SIR, and SIRI models,2 and over an
infinite tree network in which nodes may have different infection and recovery probabilities, we
show that the Jordan center of the observed infected node set is an optimal infection source estimator
under the MLIP criterion and under some mild technical assumptions. Our result corroborates that
in [12], [13], which shows that the Jordan center is the optimal source estimator for the SIR model
under assumptions slightly different from ours (cf. Section II for a detailed discussion), and that in
[10], which gives the same result for the case where the infection spreading follows the SI model,
but only a limited set of infected nodes are observed.
(ii) We show that if an infection spreads according to the SIS model over an infinite regular tree in
which all nodes have the same infection and recovery probabilities, then the Jordan center is again
the optimal infection source estimator under the MLIP criterion.
(iii) We introduce the concept of a k-Jordan center set, and show that if an infection spreads from k > 1
sources in an infinite tree network where nodes may have different infection probabilities, and in
accordance to the SI model, then the k-Jordan center set is an optimal estimator of the infection
source set under the MLIP criterion. A heuristic procedure was proposed in [11] to determine
multiple infection sources in the SI model based on the single source maximum likelihood (ML)
estimator for regular trees, but not shown to be optimal. Simulation results suggest that our estimator
outperforms that in [11] in terms of the average error distance.
(iv) We extend the Jordan center-based estimators above heuristically to general graph networks, and
perform extensive simulations to verify the performance of our estimators. We perform infection
spreading simulations on random trees, part of the Facebook network, and the western states power
grid network of the United States. In our simulation results, the Jordan center-based estimators
consistently achieve the lowest average error distance compared to the betweenness, closeness,
distance, degree, eigenvector, and pagerank centrality based heuristics.
Finding the Jordan center does not require knowledge of each node’s infection and recovery probabil-
ities. Therefore, our result in item (i) shows that the Jordan center is a universal source estimator for the
SI, SIR and SIRI models, under a wide range of spreading parameters. In contribution (ii), we show that
the Jordan center is also optimal for the SIS model in regular tree networks. Although we are not able to
2By setting the recovery probability and relapse probability in the SIRI model to zero, we obtain the SI and SIR models,
respectively. However, in this paper, for clarity and due to some differences in the assumptions we make under each of these
models, we explicitly differentiate the SIRI model from the SI and SIR models.
5show that this is true for general graphs and for multiple infection sources, our simulation results suggest
that Jordan center-based source estimators outperform many other source estimators, which similarly
do not require knowledge of the underlying infection spreading parameters, regardless of which of the
four considered infection spreading models is used. This is somewhat surprising since the SI, SIR, SIRI,
and SIS spreading mechanisms are quite different from each other. Note that although [14] and [15]
have reported better source detection rates in numerical experiments using the DMP and BP approaches
respectively, these methods require the knowledge of the underlying infection spreading parameters, and
are applicable only to the SIR model. There is also a lack of theoretical results on the optimality of the
DMP and BP approaches, and extending them to the SIRI and SIS models is highly non-trivial [24]. We
hope that the insights derived from our current work will inform future design of better source estimators
in the case where the exact values of infection parameters are unknown.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we present our system model, assumptions
and problem formulation. In Section III, we show, under some technical conditions, that the Jordan center
is an optimal source estimator for tree networks when there is a single infection source. In Section IV,
we derive an estimator for tree networks when there is an infection spreading from multiple sources
under the SI model. In Section V, we heuristically extend the proposed estimators to general graphs
and propose heuristic algorithms to find them. We present simulation results in Section VI to verify the
effectiveness of the proposed estimators. Finally we conclude and summarize in Section VII.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we present our system model, assumptions, and various notations used throughout this
paper. We also describe the most likely infection path criterion. A table summarizing the most commonly
used notations is provided at the end of this section.
A. Infection Spreading Model
We model the underlying network over which an infection spreads as an undirected graph G = (V,E),
where V is the set of nodes and E is the set of edges. Two nodes connected by an edge are called
neighbors or neighboring nodes. Suppose that an infection starts spreading from one or more source
nodes. In most of this paper, we will assume a single source node, and extend this to multiple source
nodes for the SI model described below. We adopt a discrete time spreading model in which time is
divided into discrete slots, and the states of the nodes in the graph G follow a Markov process with
6probability measure P. Our goal is to infer the infection sources from observations of the infected nodes
at a particular point in time. We consider the following four discrete time infection spreading models.
1) SI model: In the SI model, each node takes on one of 3 possible states: susceptible (s), infected (i)
and non-susceptible (n). At any time slot, if a node is infected, we say that it is in state i. The set
of uninfected nodes that have infected neighbors are in state s, and are called susceptible nodes. In
the SI model, an infected node remains infected forever, and a susceptible node becomes infected
probabilistically in the next time slot. All other nodes are in state n, and are called non-susceptible
nodes. A non-susceptible node has probability zero of becoming infected in the next time slot.
2) SIR model: In the SIR model, the possible node states are susceptible (s), infected (i), non-susceptible
(n), and recovered (r). The only difference with the SI model is that an infected node in state i
in a time slot may recover to state r in the next time slot with a positive probability. A recovered
node then stays in the recovered state r forever. In other words, a recovered node will never become
infected again.
3) SIRI model: The possible nodes states in the SIRI model are the same as for the SIR model. The
difference from the SIR model is that a recovered node (in state r) may become infected again at a
future time slot with a positive probability. This infection relapse is spontaneous, and can take place
even if the node does not have any infected neighbors. Here, we reserve the state s for those nodes
that have infected neighbors and have never been infected before.
4) SIS model: In the SIS model, the possible node states are susceptible (s), infected (i) and non-
susceptible (n). This model describes a more complicated spreading process where once an infected
node recovers from the infection (with a positive probability), it immediately becomes a susceptible
node (if it has at least one infected neighbor) or non-susceptible node (if it does not have any
infected neighbor). There is therefore no recovered state in this model.
For any node v ∈ V , we let ps(v), pi(v) and pr(v) be the probability for v to be in state i in the next
time slot conditioned on v being susceptible, infected, or recovered in the current time slot, respectively.
These probabilities characterize different infection spreading models, and we assume that they satisfy the
following Assumptions 1–4. Let α = minu∈V ps(u) and β = maxu∈V ps(u). For simplicity, we assume
that ps(v), pi(v) and pr(v) do not change over time slots for each v, although all our results and proofs
(with slight modifications) are still valid if these probabilities are time-varying as long as Assumptions
1–4 hold over all time slots.
7Assumption 1. Under the SI model, for every v ∈ V , we have
β ≤
α
(1− α)2
. (1)
See Fig. 1 for the region where (α, β) satisfies the inequality (1). For example, if α ≥ 0.382, then
(1) holds since its right hand side is greater than 1. In the inequality (1), we assume that the infection
probabilities at each node in the network does not differ drastically for the SI model. This is required
because in this work, we do not assume knowledge of the exact infection rates at each node. Therefore,
if part of the network has nodes that are much easier to infect than other nodes, then any estimator with
no knowledge of the infection rates will result in a highly biased result, which may not do better on
average than making random choices for the infection sources. We provide an example in Fig. 3 to show
that Assumption 1 is a necessary condition for Theorem 1 to hold for the SI model.
Fig. 1. Illustration of the region where (α, β) satisfies (1).
Assumption 2. Under the SIR model, for every v ∈ V , we have
0 ≤ pi(v) ≤
√
α
β
. (2)
The reference [12] assumes that ps(v) is the same for every v ∈ V , which implies that α = β, and (2)
then reduces to the trivial condition 0 ≤ pi(v) ≤ 1. It also assumes that pi(v) is the same for every v ∈ V .
Therefore, the setup in [12] is a special case of the problem studied in this paper. On the other hand, the
reference [13] considers the SIR model under a heterogeneous setting, where an infection is transmitted
across each edge (u, v) with probability p(u, v) so that ps(v) = 1 −
∏
u∈Nv
(1 − p(u, v)), where Nv is
8the set of infected neighbors of node v at the beginning of the current time slot. However, since [13]
considers undirected graphs with p(u, v) = p(v, u) for all edges (u, v) (see Fig. 3 for a counterexample
if edge infection probabilities are not symmetric), no additional assumptions are required to show that
the Jordan center is an optimal estimator under the MLIP criterion for an infinite tree, where each node
has degree at least 2. In a social network, the strength of influence might not be symmetric between each
pair of friends. Therefore, we do not make this assumption.
Assumption 3. Under the SIRI model, for every v ∈ V , we have
β − α
1− α
≤ pi(v) ≤
√
α
β
, (3)
1−
√
α
β
≤ pr(v) ≤ min
{
1,
√
α
β
pi(v)
1− pi(v)
}
. (4)
See Fig. 2 for the region of (α, β) that makes (3) feasible. Note that if α = β, (3) reduces to
0 ≤ pi(v) ≤ 1, and (4) reduces to 0 ≤ pr(v) ≤ min
{
1, pi(v)1−pi(v)
}
. Inequality (4) implies that a node
does not easily relapse into an infected state (i.e., small pr) if it recovers quickly (i.e., small pi). This
is intuitively appealing as it corresponds to the case where if an infected node has a low probability of
staying infected in the next time slot, then it is unlikely for the node to relapse into the infection once it
has recovered. A practical example is: it is hard to re-convince someone to believe a rumor if he already
has a reason to reject the rumor.
Fig. 2. Illustration of the region where (α, β) satisfies (3).
9Assumption 4. Under the SIS model, for every v ∈ V , we have
ps(v) = ps,
pi(v) = pi,
0 ≤ ps ≤ pi ≤ 1. (5)
Inequality (5) helps us to avoid the case where an infection spreads very fast (i.e., large ps) and infected
nodes also recover relatively quickly (i.e., pi < ps) from happening. In such cases, infected nodes close
to sources are likely to have recovered by the time we observe the state of the network, while there may
be a significant set of infected nodes at a distance away from the source. Therefore, trying to estimate
the source nodes will result in a large bias.
In Assumptions 1-3 for the SI, SIR and SIRI models, the infection, recovery, and relapse probabilities
can vary between different nodes. We call such networks heterogeneous. On the other hand, in Assumption
4, the infection and recovery probabilities are the same for all nodes in the network. We call such networks
homogeneous.
B. Most Likely Infection Path Sources Estimator
In this subsection, we present the MLIP statistical criterion that we adopt to find the optimal infection
sources in this paper. We focus on the single source formulation in the following description, and extend
to the multiple sources case in Section IV. The following exposition and definitions follow mainly from
[10], and is repeated here for completeness.
Let X(u, t) be a random variable denoting the state of a node u in time slot t. At time 0, suppose
that there is a single infected node s∗ ∈ V , which we call the infection source. Let Xt = {X(u, τ) :
u ∈ V, 1 ≤ τ ≤ t} be the collection of the states of all nodes in V from time 1 to t. A realization
Xt = {X(u, τ) : u ∈ V, 1 ≤ τ ≤ t} of Xt is an infection path. At time t, we observe the set of
nodes that are currently infected. The observed set of infected nodes is denoted Vi and is assumed to be
non-empty. We assume that the elapsed time t is unknown. We say that an infection path Xt is consistent
with Vi if we have X(u, t) = i for all u ∈ Vi and no other nodes in V is infected in Xt. Conditioned on
s being the infection source, we let Xs be the set of all possible infection paths consistent with Vi, and
Ts be the set of the corresponding feasible elapsed times.
We want to estimate the infection source based only on knowledge of Vi and the underlying graph G.
Finding the ML estimator for a single infection source in the SI model for a general graph network is
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a #P-complete problem [7]. (Note that [7] considers a spreading model in which the propagation time
of the infection across an edge has exponential distribution with rate 1. Due to the memoryless property
of the exponential distribution, the problem of estimating the source in [7]’s model can be reduced to
the problem of estimating the source in a discrete time spreading model where time is discretized into
unit intervals, and the probability of an infection spreading across an edge in each time slot is 1− e−1.
Therefore, under the discrete time spreading model, finding the ML estimator is also a #P-complete
problem.) We consider instead an alternative statistical criterion first proposed by [12], and given by
sˆ ∈ arg max
s∈V
t∈Ts,Xt∈Xs
P(Xt = Xt | s∗ = s). (6)
The basic idea behind (6) is to estimate the source as the node associated with a most likely infection
path out of all possible infection paths that are consistent with Vi. The search of a most likely infection
path depends not only on the elapsed time but also on the structure of the underlying graph. Even at
a given elapsed time, the number of consistent paths cannot be calculated easily, and the most likely
infection paths are not unique. Solving (6) directly involves searching over both Ts and Xs, whose size
increases exponentially fast with the number of nodes. In order to derive insights into an optimal source
estimator for (6), we first consider the network with a single source in Section III. With the utilization
of some properties of the elapsed times, we reduce the objective function to a simpler formulation and
derive an estimator for all four considered infection spreading models. In Section IV, we generalize the
idea to a tree network with multiple sources for the SI model.
C. Some Notations and Definitions
In this subsection, we list some notations and definitions that we use throughout this paper. We refer
the reader to a summary of basic notations given in Table I.
For a given tree network A with v being the root, we assign directions to each edge of A so that
all edges point towards v. For any u ∈ A, let pa(u) be the parent node of node u (i.e., the node with
an incoming edge from u), and ch(u) be the set of child nodes of u in A (i.e., the set of nodes with
outgoing edges to u).
For any infection path Xt, a subset J ⊂ V , and 0 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ t, let Xt(J, [i, j]) be the states of nodes
in J from time slots i to j in the infection path Xt. To avoid cluttered expressions, we abuse notations
and let
Ps
(
Xt(J, [i, j])
)
, P
(
X
t(J, [i, j]) = Xt(J, [i, j]) | s∗ = s
)
.
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TABLE I
SUMMARY OF NOTATIONS
s∗ the true infection source
G = (V,E) the underlying graph network
α minu∈V ps(u)
β maxu∈V ps(u)
Hv the minimum connected subgraph of G that contains Vi and the node v
|A| the number of elements in A if A is a set, or the number of nodes in A if A is a graph
V (u, i) the set of nodes i hops away from node u
Tu(v;A) the subtree rooted at node u of the tree A, with the first link of the path from u to v in A removed
d(s, u) the length of the shortest path between s and u in the graph G (i.e., the distance between them)
ts a most likely elapsed time conditioned on s being the infection source
Xs the set of all possible infection paths consistent with Vi conditioned on s being the source
Ts the set of the feasible elapsed time corresponding to Xs
Therefore, Ps(Xt) represents the probability of Xt conditioned on s being the source and t being the
elapsed time. Moreover, when we want to remind the reader of the state of a node u at a specific time
in the conditional probability Ps(Xt), we use the notation Ps(X(u, i) = a), where a ∈ {i, s, r,n} is the
state of u at time i.
Definition 1 (Most likely infection paths). For any s ∈ V and any feasible elapsed time t ∈ Ts, we say
that an infection path Xt is most likely for (s, t) if Xt ∈ argmaxX˜t∈Xs Ps(X˜t). Moreover, an infection
path Xt is called a most likely infection path if there exists some s ∈ V , and t ∈ Ts such that
Ps(X
t) = max
u∈V,r∈Tu,Y r∈Xu
Pu(Y
r).
Definition 2 (Jordan center). For any node s ∈ V , let its infection range be
d¯(s, Vi) , max
u∈Vi
d(s, u).
Any node in G with minimum infection range is called the Jordan center of Vi.
Finally, in several of our proofs, we need to differentiate between subtrees that have infected nodes or
not.
Definition 3 (Uninfected subtree and infected subtree). Suppose that v is the infection source. For any
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node u, we say that Tu(v;G) is an uninfected subtree if 3
Tu(v;G)
⋂
Vi = ∅;
and we say that Tu(v;G) is an infected subtree if
Tu(v;G)
⋂
Vi 6= ∅.
III. SINGLE SOURCE ESTIMATION FOR TREES
In this section, we show that a Jordan center of the infected node set Vi is an optimal infection source
estimator universally applicable for infection spreading under the SI, SIR, and SIRI models for trees, and
the SIS model for regular trees. The Jordan center has previously been shown to be optimal estimators for
SI infection spreading [10] and for the SIR model [12], [13], but under different technical assumptions.
As noted in Section I, proving optimality results for infection source estimators is in general challeng-
ing. In most of this paper, we restrict ourselves to the following specific graph networks depending on
the infection spreading model. We say that a tree is an infinite tree if every node in it has degree at least
two.
Assumption 5. For an infection spreading according to the SI, SIR or SIRI models, the underlying graph
G is an infinite tree. For an infection spreading according to the SIS model, the underlying graph G is
a regular infinite tree, i.e., every node has the same degree.
For the SI, SIR, and SIRI models, Assumption 5 is adopted to avoid boundary effects. Consider the
extreme case where a source node has only one neighbor. Then, the infection can spread away from the
source in only one direction. In this case, any estimator based only on the graph topology is expected
to perform badly. In the SIS model, a recovered node is the same as a susceptible node, which leads to
more complex evolution of the node states in the network as compared to the SIRI model in which the
state evolution of a recovered node becomes independent from the rest of the network. To simplify the
problem, we restrict to regular trees for the SIS model in Assumption 5. The problem of finding optimal
source estimators for the SIS model in more general network topologies remains open.
A. Most Likely Elapsed Time
We assume no knowledge of the elapsed time when the set of nodes Vi is observed. Suppose that
v ∈ V is the source, then the feasible set of all elapsed times is given by Tv = [d¯(v, Vi),+∞), where
3See Table I for the definition of Tu(v;G).
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the lower bound is the minimum amount of time required for the infection to spread from v to all the
nodes in Vi. It is obviously computationally inefficient to search over all elapsed times. In Proposition
1, we show how to find a most likely elapsed time tv that maximizes the probability of observing Vi.
Proposition 1. Suppose that Assumptions 1–4 hold, v ∈ V is the infection source, and a non-empty set
of infected nodes Vi is observed. For an infection under the SI, SIR, SIRI or SIS model in a network
satisfying Assumption 5, we have for any t ∈ Tv, and any two most likely infection paths Xt for (v, t)
and Y t+1 for (v, t+ 1),
(a) Pv(Y t+1) ≤ δPv(Xt), where δ = (1 − α)2,
√
α
β
,
√
α
β
and 1 for the SI, SIR, SIRI and SIS model,
respectively; and
(b) conditioned on v being the infection source, a most likely elapsed time is given by
tv = d¯(v, Vi).
The proof of Proposition 1 is provided in Appendix A. Proposition 1(b) shows a universal property
that is robust to the underlying infection spreading models: a most likely elapsed time tv is the infection
range of v (cf. Definition 2). Moreover, Proposition 1(a) shows that a most likely elapsed time should
be as small as possible. This result is intuitive. Consider the conditional probability
Pv(X
t) =
∏
u∈V,τ∈[1,t]
Pv(u, τ),
where the value of each term in the product on the right hand side is at most 1. When t decreases, there
are less terms in the product, which in turn increases the value of Pv(Xt).
Following Proposition 1, the problem in (6) is now reduced to
sˆ ∈ arg max
v∈V,tv=d¯(v,Vi)
Xtv∈Xv
Pv(X
tv ).
After the most likely elapsed time has been identified, we can now proceed to find the source node
associated with the most likely infection path.
B. Source Associated With the Most Likely Infection Path
In this subsection, we derive the source estimator associated with a most likely infection path for all
four considered infection spreading models, under specific graph networks. Although Proposition 1 gives
a most likely elapsed time tv conditioned on a node v ∈ V being the infection source, it is still difficult
to count the number of infection paths that are consistent with Vi, not to mention finding the most likely
14
infection path for (v, tv). Therefore, instead of directly looking for the most likely infection path, we
first consider the conditional probabilities Pv(Xtv ) and Pu(Y tu) of two infection paths, where v and u
are a pair of neighboring nodes, Xtv is a most likely infection path for (v, tv), and Y tu is a most likely
infection path for (u, tu). We then show that if v has a smaller infection range, Pv(Xtv ) is not less
than Pu(Y tu). Upon establishing this neighboring node relationship, we can find a path on which the
infection range of each node is decreasing, and the conditional probability of the most likely infection
path is non-decreasing. This in turn implies that the Jordan center of Vi is the source estimator we are
looking for. The neighboring node relationship is summarized in Proposition 2, the proof of which is
provided in Appendix B.
Proposition 2. Suppose that Vi is non-empty. For an infection process under the SI, SIR, SIRI or SIS
model satisfying Assumptions 1-5, and for any pair of neighboring nodes u and v, we have
Pv(X
tv ) ≥ Pu(Y
tu), if tv < tu,
where Xtv and Y tu are most likely infection paths for (v, tv) and (u, tu) respectively.
We note that Proposition 1 and Proposition 2 match Proposition 2 and Lemma 4 in [10], respectively.
Then following the same proof as Theorem 1 in [10], we have the following result.
Theorem 1. Suppose that Vi is non-empty. For an infection process under the SI, SIR, SIRI or SIS model
satisfying Assumptions 1–4, respectively, and Assumption 5 holds, a Jordan center of Vi is an optimal
source estimator for (6).
Theorem 1 shows that for regular infinite trees, a Jordan center is an optimal source estimator, regardless
of which of the four considered infection spreading model the infection is following. This is a somewhat
surprising result since the four infection spreading models are fundamentally different. The “universality”
of the Jordan center makes it highly desirable in practice, where the underlying infection spreading model
is usually unknown a priori. A distributed linear time complexity algorithm has been proposed in [10]
to find the Jordan center in a tree, which makes timely estimation of the infection source possible.
In Fig. 3, we provide an example to show that Assumption 1 is a necessary condition for Theorem 1
to hold for the SI infection process. Similar examples can be used to show that Assumptions 2, 3 and 4
are necessary for Theorem 1 to hold for the SIR, SIRI and SIS infection process, respectively.
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Fig. 3. An example that shows Assumption 1 is a necessary condition for Theorem 1 to hold for the SI infection process.
Suppose the infection process follows the SI model. If node d (Jordan center of Vi) is the infection source, for an infection path
X2 with elapsed time 2, we have Pd(X2) = β3α. On the other hand, if node e is the infection source, for an infection path
Y 3 with elapsed time 3 and in which node f is infected in the first time slot, we have Pe(Y 3) = β4(1− α)2. For d to be the
optimal MLIP estimator, we require Pd(X2) ≥ Pe(Y 3), which in turn requires β ≤ α/(1− α)2.
IV. MULTIPLE SOURCES ESTIMATION FOR SI INFECTION SPREADING IN TREES
In this section, we restrict our discussion to an infection spreading under the SI model. Since the
optimal single infection source estimator has been shown to be the Jordan center of Vi in Section III,
we consider here the case where there are k > 1 infection sources, i.e., S∗ = {s∗1, s∗2, · · · , s∗k}. Then the
most likely infection path based sources estimation problem becomes
Sˆ ∈ arg max
S⊂V,|S|=k
t∈TS ,Xt∈XS
P(Xt = Xt | S∗ = S). (7)
The definitions in Section II-C are similarly generalized to the case of k infection sources by replacing
s with S in the definitions. In particular, we generalize the Jordan center definition to k-Jordan infection
center set.
Definition 4 (k-Jordan center set). The infection range of a set of source nodes S = {s1, s2, · · · , sk} is
defined as
d¯(S, Vi) = max
u∈Vi
min
si∈S
d(si, u).
The set of k nodes in G with minimum infection range is called the k-Jordan center set of Vi.
Without loss of generality, we assume that the minimum subgraph B of G that contains Vi is connected,
otherwise the same estimation procedure can be applied to each component of B. We first show a similar
result as that in Proposition 1. The proof of Proposition 3 is provided in Appendix C.
Proposition 3. Suppose that the underlying network G is an infinite tree, the infection sources are
S = {s1, s2, · · · , sk}, and the set of observed infected nodes Vi is non-empty. For an infection spreading
under the SI model, any most likely infection path Xt for (S, t) has the following properties:
16
(a) PS(Xt) is non-increasing in t ∈ TS; and
(b) conditioned on S being the infection sources, a most likely elapsed time for Xt is given by
tS = d¯(S, Vi).
In the following, we show how to transform the k sources estimation problem to an equivalent single
source estimation problem, then we can use Theorem 1 to find the optimal multiple sources estimator.
We first introduce the definition of super node graph. See Fig. 4 for an illustration of the super node
graph construction.
Definition 5 (Super node graph). Suppose that G is an infinite tree. Given a set S = {s1, s2, · · · , sk} ⊂ V ,
where k > 1, and any infection path Xt conditioned on S being the infection sources, the super node
graph G˜(S,Xt) is constructed using the following procedure for each τ = 0, 1, . . . , t:
• Starting at τ = 0, we initialize Ai = {si} for each i = 1, . . . , k.
• For each τ = 1, . . . , t, consider every node v ∈ Vi that becomes susceptible at time τ in Xt for the
first time. Let Nv be the set of neighboring nodes of v that is infected at time τ − 1. We choose a
node u ∈ Nv uniformly at random, and include v and the edge (u, v) in the component Ai that u
belongs to.
• Based on the resulting graph A =
⋃k
i=1Ai, the super node graph G˜(S,Xt) is constructed by
considering all infection sources as a single virtual node, which we call a super node and denote
as Supernode(S).
In summary, we trace the infection path Xt and assign each infected node to the tree Ai if its infection
comes from si, with ties broken randomly. This then partitions the infection graph G into disjoint trees
rooted at each si ∈ S. The trees are connected together to form the super node graph by treating S as a
single “super node”.
Given any infection path Xt following the SI model, it can be shown that (with probability one)
the conditional probability PS(Xt) is the same for G and any corresponding G˜(S,Xt) as defined in
Definition 5. Consider any node v with |Nv|> 1 and assume v becomes susceptible at time slot t1 and
becomes infected at time slot t2. Then PS(Xt(v, [1, t])) = (1 − ps)t2−t1−1ps, regardless of the number
of infected neighbors v has as long as there is at least one infected neighbor.4 We formally present this
result in the following lemma.
4This property does not hold for an infection following the SIR, SIRI or SIS model, where some infected neighbors of v may
recover after t1 and PS(Xt(v, [1, t])) may change if we remove some edges connecting v.
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(a) Given any infection path Xt, suppose mi becomes susceptible at time τ1
in Xt for the first time. Suppose mi+1 becomes susceptible at time τ2 > τ1 in
Xt for the first time when mi+2 becomes infected, while mi stays susceptible
at time τ2. Then nodes in B belong to component A1 and nodes in C belong
to component A2.
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(c) Constructed super node graph G˜(S,Xt).
Fig. 4. Illustration of the construction of the super node graph G˜(S,Xt) from an infinite tree G with S = {s1, s2} being the
infection sources.
Lemma 1. Let S = {s1, s2, · · · , sk} ⊂ V , where k > 1. Given any infection path Xt conditioned on S
being the infection sources, PS(Xt) is the same for both G and any corresponding G˜(S,Xt) as defined
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in Definition 5.
Following Lemma 1, instead of searching for a most likely infection path for S in G, we can now
search for a most likely infection path for Supernode(S) in a corresponding super node graph G˜(S,Xt).
In this way, we transform the k sources estimation problem to an equivalent single source estimation
problem. As discussed in Section III, Theorem 1 shows that a Jordan center of the infected node set
is an optimal single source estimator. Therefore, our objective is to find a set of k nodes S, where
Supernode(S) is a Jordan center of the infected node set in G˜(S,Xt). We show in the following lemma
that k-Jordan center set is the solution.
Lemma 2. Suppose that G is an infinite tree and the set of infected nodes Vi is non-empty. Given any
infection path Xt consistent with Vi under the SI model, if S = {s1, s2, · · · , sk} is the k-Jordan center
set of Vi in G, then Supernode(S) is a Jordan center of Vi in any corresponding super node graph
G˜(S,Xt).
The proof of Lemma 2 is provided in Appendix D. The following theorem follows immediately from
Lemma 2 and Theorem 1.
Theorem 2. Suppose that G is an infinite tree and there are k > 1 infection sources. For an infection
in the SI model, a k-Jordan center set of Vi is an optimal source set estimator for (7).
Theorem 2 is consistent with Theorem 1 for an infection in the SI model. Due to the difficulty described
in footnote 4, the multiple-sources estimation problem remains an open problem for more complicated
infection spreading models including SIR, SIRI and SIS models. To verify the robustness of the proposed
estimators, we conduct extensive simulations on both trees and general networks for SI, SIR, SIRI and
SIS models in Section VI.
V. SOURCE ESTIMATION FOR GENERAL GRAPHS
In this section, we consider the case where the underlying network G is a general graph. Inspired
by the robustness of Jordan center estimators in tree networks, we heuristically extend them to general
graphs. We first review an algorithm, proposed in [12], that finds the Jordan center for k = 1. We then
propose a heuristic algorithm to find the k-Jordan center set for k > 1.
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A. Single Jordan Center Estimation Algorithm
A simple algorithm was proposed in [12] to find the Jordan center of Vi when there is a single source
and the underlying network is a general graph. Let any node in Vi broadcast a message containing its own
identity. The first node that receives messages from every node in Vi declares itself as a Jordan center
and the algorithm terminates. We call this algorithm the Single Jordan Center estimation algorithm (SJC),
with a computational complexity of O(|V ||E|).
B. Multiple Jordan Center Set Estimation Algorithm
When k is greater than 1, it is usually impractical to use exhaustive search methods to find the k-
Jordan center set as the number of possible k-Jordan center sets is
(|V |
k
)
. Therefore, we propose a heuristic
algorithm to find an approximate k-Jordan center set when there are k > 1 sources and the underlying
network is a general graph, which we call the Multiple Jordan Center set estimation algorithm (MJC).
MJC starts with randomly selecting a set of k nodes Sˆ0 = {s0i }ki=1 as the initial guess, and then utilizes
an iterative two-step optimization approach. Specifically, in iteration l, let Sˆl = {sli}ki=1 be the k-Jordan
center set estimate. We perform the following two steps at each iteration l:
• Partition step. In this step, MJC partitions Vi into k sets M1,M2, · · · ,Mk such that for all v ∈Mi,
d(sl−1i , v) ≤ d(s
l−1
j , v) if i 6= j. We call Mi the Voronoi set corresponding to s
l−1
i . To do this, let
each sl−1i broadcast a message. The broadcasting process terminates when each node v ∈ Vi receives
at least one message from a node in Sˆl−1. In the broadcasting process, each node v ∈ Vi learns the
distance between itself and the nearest nodes in Sˆl−1. We choose a nearest node in Sˆl−1 at random,
and add v to the Voronoi set corresponding to this node.
• Re-optimization step. In this step, MJC updates each estimate sl−1i in the Voronoi sets Mi. For
each Voronoi set Mi, run SJC to find the Jordan center of Mi and set it as the new estimate sli.
MJC terminates when max1≤i≤k d(sl−1i , sli) ≤ η for some predetermined small positive value η or when
the number of iterations reach a predetermined positive number MaxIter. For the partition step in each
iteration, the computation complexity is dominated by the broadcasting process, with a computational
complexity of O(k|E|). For the re-optimization step in each iteration, the computational complexity is
O(|V ||E|) due to SJC. Therefore, the overall computational complexity for MJC is O(MaxIter · |V ||E|).
We show in the following proposition that the infection range is non-increasing over the iterations of
MJC. The proof of Proposition 4 is provided in Appendix E.
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Proposition 4. Suppose that G is a general graph and there are k > 1 infection sources. The infection
range (cf. Definition 4) of is non-increasing over the iterations of MJC, i.e.,
d¯(Sˆl, Vi) ≤ d¯(Sˆ
l−1, Vi).
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we present simulation results using both synthetic and real world networks to evaluate
the performance of the proposed estimators. We simulate infection spreading under the SI, SIR, SIRI
and SIS models in both homogeneous and heterogeneous networks, and for single and multiple infection
sources.
A. Single Infection Source
When there is a single infection source, we use the following six common centrality measures and
random guessing as benchmarks to compare with our estimator. The first four definitions are the same
as those in [10], and are repeated here for the convenience of the reader.
(i) The betweenness center (BC) is defined as
BC , argmax
v∈G
∑
i,j∈Vi,i 6=j 6=v
σij(v)
σij
,
where σij is the number of shortest paths between node i and node j, and σij(v) is the number of
those shortest paths that contain v.
(ii) The closeness center (CC) is defined as
CC , argmax
v∈G
∑
i∈Vi,i 6=v
1
d(v, i)
.
(iii) The distance center (DisC) is defined as
DisC , argmin
v∈G
∑
i∈Vi
d(v, i).
For trees, the DisC is the same as the rumor center defined in [7], and it is shown in [7] that the
DisC is the ML estimator for regular trees under the SI model with a single source.
(iv) Let H denote the minimum connected subgraph of G that contains Vi. The degree center (DegC)
is defined as
DegC , argmax
v∈H
|NH(v)|,
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where NH(v) is the set of neighbors of v in H , and |NH(v)| is defined to be the degree centrality
of v.
(v) The eigenvector centrality function of H is a function EC : H 7→ R such that for any node v in H ,
we have
EC(v) = 1
λ
∑
i∈NH(v)
EC(i),
where NH(v) is the set of neighbors of v in H , and λ is a constant. Then the eigenvector center
(EC) is the node in H with maximum eigenvector centrality.
(vi) The pagerank centrality of any node v in H is defined as
PC(v) = d
∑
i∈NH(v)
PC(i)
|NH(i)|
+
1− d
|H|
,
where NH(v) is the set of neighbors of v in H , and d is a damping factor in (0, 1). Then the
pagerank center (PC) is the node in H with maximum pagerank centrality.
(vii) The random guess estimator randomly selects a node in H as the source estimator.
We evaluate the performance of our proposed estimator on three kinds of networks: random tree
networks where the degree of every node is randomly chosen from [3, 5], a small part of the Facebook
network with 4039 nodes [25] and the western states power grid network of the United States [26].
We consider both homogeneous and heterogeneous networks. In the homogeneous networks, we vary
the recovery and relapse probabilities to demonstrate the impact of these spreading parameters on the
performance of the proposed estimator. In the heterogeneous networks, we evaluate the robustness of the
proposed estimator on a wide range of randomly generated spreading parameters. In the following, we
describe the four different simulation experiments.
1) SI and SIRI models in homogeneous networks: For every v ∈ V , we let ps(v) = ps, pi(v) = pi and
pr(v) = pr, where the infection probabilities are set as follows: ps is randomly chosen from [0, 1], pi is
set to be 0.1, 0.2, · · · , 1, respectively, and pr is randomly chosen from [0,min{1, pi1−pi }]. For each kind
of network and each value of pi, we perform 1000 simulation runs. In each simulation run, we randomly
pick a node as the infection source and simulate the infection using the above parameters. The spreading
terminates when the number of infected nodes is greater than 100. We then run SJC on the observed
infected nodes to estimate the infection source and compare the result with the benchmarks.
The error distance is the number of hops between the estimated and the actual infection source, and
is shown in Fig. 5. We see that the proposed estimator performs consistently better than the benchmarks
for all considered networks. The random guess estimator actually performs better or comparable with
22
some estimators like DegC and EC as these estimators only capture the local “connectivity” of a node,
instead of the topological information inherent in the network.
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
a
v
e
ra
g
e
 e
rr
o
r 
 d
is
ta
n
c
e
 
SJC BC CC
DisC DegC EC
PC Random
??
SI
(a) Random trees.
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(c) Power grid network.
Fig. 5. Average error distances with error bars of 95% confidence interval for various networks and different values of pi in
homogeneous networks. The underlying infection follows the SIRI model for all values of pi and the infection follows the SI
model when pi = 1.
2) SIR and SIRI models in homogeneous networks: The infection probabilities are set as follows: ps
is randomly chosen from [0, 1], pi is randomly chosen from [0.5, 1], and pr is set to be 0, 0.1, · · · , 1.
We compare the performances in Fig. 6. We see that our proposed estimator again performs consistently
better than the benchmarks.
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(b) Facebook network.
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(c) Power grid network.
Fig. 6. Average error distances with error bars of 95% confidence interval for various networks and different values of pr in
homogeneous networks. The underlying infection follows the SIRI model for all values of pr and the infection follows the SIR
model when pr = 0.
3) SIS model in homogeneous networks: We consider the SIS model where pi is set to be 0.5, 0.6, · · · , 1,
respectively, and ps is randomly chosen from [0, pi]. In Fig. 7, we observe that our proposed estimator
always results in smaller average error distances than the benchmarks for all considered networks.
4) SI, SIR, SIRI, and SIS models in heterogeneous networks: In this experiment, we drop the Assump-
tions 1-4 and randomly choose the infection probabilities ps(v), pi(v), pr(v) from [0, 1] for any node v.
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Fig. 7. Average error distances with error bars of 95% confidence interval for various networks and different values of pi in
homogeneous networks under the SIS model.
We then run simulations under the SI, SIR, SIRI, and SIS models, and compare the performances in Fig.
8. We see that SJC outperforms all the benchmarks.
B. Multiple Infection Sources
In this subsection, we consider the cases where k = 2 or k = 3 infection sources exist, respectively. By
finding betweenness center, closeness center or distance center of each Voronoi set in the re-optimization
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(b) SIR model.
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(c) SIRI model.
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(d) SIS model.
Fig. 8. Average error distances with error bars of 95% confidence interval for various networks under the SI, SIR, SIRI and
SIS models in heterogeneous networks.
step of MJC, we heuristically find multiple betweenness center set (MBC), multiple closeness center
set (MCC) or multiple distance center set (MDisC) estimators, respectively. We also extend DegC, EC
and PC by finding the k nodes in H with largest degree centralities, eigenvector centralities, pagerank
centralities, respectively. Finally, for random guessing, we randomly pick K nodes in H as the estimator.
We use MBC, MCC, MDisC, DegC, EC, PC and random guessing as comparison benchmarks.
For the SI, SIR, SIRI and SIS models, we randomly choose the corresponding infection probabilities
ps(v), pi(v), pr(v) from [0, 1] for any node v. For each value of k, each kind of network and each
infection spreading model, we perform 1000 simulation runs. In each simulation run, we randomly pick
k nodes as the infection sources and simulate the infection using the above mentioned spreading model.
The spreading terminates when the number of infected nodes is greater than 100. We then run MJC on
the observed infected nodes to estimate the infection sources and compare the result with the benchmarks.
To quantify the performance of each algorithm, we first match the estimated with the actual sources
so that the sum of the error distances between each estimated source and its match is minimized. Then
the mean error distance is the average of the error distances for all matched pairs, and is shown in Fig.
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9 and Fig. 10 for k = 2 and k = 3, respectively. We see that the proposed estimator performs better than
the benchmarks for all considered networks under all considered infection spreading models.
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(c) SIRI model.
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Fig. 9. Average mean error distances with error bars of 95% confidence interval for various networks under different infection
spreading models when there are two infection sources.
VII. CONCLUSION
We have investigated the problem of estimating infection sources in a network for the SI, SIR, SIRI
and SIS infection spreading models. For the case where a single infection source exists in an infinite tree
network and under some technical assumptions, we have shown that the Jordan center of the infected
node set is a universal infection source estimator for the SI, SIR, SIRI or SIS model. When there exists
more than one infection sources in a tree network, we have shown that the k-Jordan center set is an
optimal infection source set estimator for the SI model. Simulations have been conducted on random
trees, part of the Facebook network and the western states power grid network of the United States. The
results suggest that our estimators perform consistently better than the betweenness, closeness, distance,
degree, eigenvector, and pagerank centrality based heuristics.
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(a) SI model.
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(b) SIR model.
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(c) SIRI model.
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(d) SIS model.
Fig. 10. Average mean error distances with error bars of 95% confidence interval for various networks under different infection
spreading models when there are three infection sources.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
For any t ∈ Tv, consider any most likely infection path Y t+1 for (v, t + 1). To show claim (a), it
suffices to construct an infection path X˜t for (v, t) such that
Pv(Y
t+1) ≤ δPv(X˜
t), (8)
since Pv(X˜t) ≤ Pv(Xt).
A. SI model
We first focus on any neighboring node u of v and consider Tu(v;G). We claim that there exists an
infection path X˜t such that
Pv(Y
t+1(Tu(v;G), [1, t + 1])) ≤ (1− α)Pv(X˜
t(Tu(v;G), [1, t])). (9)
We can see that Tu(v;G) is either an uninfected subtree or infected subtree. In the following, we consider
these two cases in order.
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Suppose that Tu(v;G) is an uninfected subtree. We have for any X˜t
Pv(Y
t+1(Tu(v;G), [1, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(Tu(v;G), [1, t]))
=
(1 − ps(u))
t+1
(1− ps(u))t
≤ 1− α. (10)
Suppose that Tu(v;G) is an infected subtree.
If Y t+1(u, 1) = s, we let X˜t(Tu(v;G), [1, t]) = Y t+1(Tu(v;G), [2, t + 1]), yielding
Pv(Y
t+1(Tu(v;G), [1, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(Tu(v;G), [1, t]))
=
Pv(Y
t+1(u, 1) = s)Pv(Y
t+1(Tu(v;G), [2, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(Tu(v;G), [1, t]))
= 1− ps(u)
≤ 1− α.
If Y t+1(u, 1) = i, we show (9) by mathematical induction on d¯(v, Vi).
Basis step: Suppose that d¯(v, Vi) = 1.
We let X˜t(u, 1) = i. After it gets infected at time slot 1, node u serves as the infection source of the
subtree Tu(v;G) with the infection starting at time 1. From the assumption d¯(v, Vi) = 1, it follows that
Tw(u;G) is an uninfected subtree for any w ∈ V (u, 1)
⋂
Tu(v;G). Then following (10), we have
Pv(Y
t+1(Tu(v;G), [1, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(Tu(v;G), [1, t]))
=
Pv(Y
t+1(u, 1) = i)Pv(Y
t+1(Tu(v;G), [2, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t+1(u, 1) = i)Pv(X˜t(Tu(v;G), [2, t]))
=
∏
w∈V (u,1)
⋂
Tu(u;G)
Pv(Y
t+1(Tw(u;G), [2, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(Tw(v;G), [2, t]))
≤ (1− α)|V (u,1)
⋂
Tu(v;G)|
≤ 1− α,
where the last inequality follows from Assumption 5. This completes the proof for the basis step.
Inductive step: Assume (9) holds for d¯(v, Vi) ≤ n − 1, where n ≥ 2. We want to show that (9) also
holds for d¯(v, Vi) = n.
Assume d¯(v, Vi) = n and let X˜t(u, 1) = i. After it becomes infected at time slot 1, node u serves as the
infection source of the subtree Tu(v;G) with the infection starting at time 1. Since d¯(u, Vi
⋂
Tu(v;G)) ≤
n− 1, from the induction assumption and for any w ∈ V (u, 1)
⋂
Tu(v;G), we can find a X˜t such that
Pv(Y
t+1(Tw(u;G), [2, t + 1])) ≤ (1− α)Pv(X˜
t(Tw(u;G), [2, t])).
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We then have,
Pv(Y
t+1(Tu(v;G), [1, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(Tu(v;G), [1, t]))
=
Pv(Y
t+1(u, 1) = i)Pv(Y
t+1(Tu(v;G), [2, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t+1(u, 1) = i)Pv(X˜t(Tu(v;G), [2, t]))
=
∏
w∈V (u,1)
⋂
Tu(u;G)
Pv(Y
t+1(Tw(u;G), [2, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(Tw(v;G), [2, t]))
≤ (1− α)|V (u,1)
⋂
Tu(v;G)|
≤ 1− α,
where the last inequality follows from Assumption 5. This completes the proof for the inductive step,
and the claim is now proved.
By constructing X˜t to satisfy (9) for all u ∈ V (v, 1), we have
Pv(Y
t+1)
Pv(X˜t)
=
∏
u∈V (v,1)
Pv(Y
t+1(Tu(v;G), [1, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(Tu(v;G), [1, t]))
≤ (1− α)|V (v,1)|
≤ (1− α)2,
where the last inequality follows from Assumption 5. This completes the proof of claim (a) for the SI
model.
B. SIR and SIRI model
We first present a property of the SIRI model in Lemma A.1.
Lemma A.1. Suppose that v ∈ V is the infection source and v has only one neighboring node u. Suppose
that the set of observed infected nodes Vi is non-empty. Consider an infection under the SIRI model and
suppose Assumptions 3 and 5 hold. For any t ∈ Tv and any most likely infection path Y t+1 for (v, t+1),
there exists an infection path X˜t, such that
(a) Pv(Y t+1(v, [1, t + 1])) ≤
√
α
β
Pv(X˜
t(v, [1, t]));
(b) Pv(Y t+1(Tu(v;G), [1, t + 1])) ≤ Pv(X˜(Tu(v;G), [1, t])); and
(c) Pv(Y t+1) ≤
√
α
β
Pv(X˜
t).
The proof of Lemma A.1 is provided in Appendix F. Lemma A.1 shows that, in the SIRI model, a
most likely elapsed time tv should be as small as possible when the source has only one neighboring
node. We now extend this result to prove Proposition 1(a) for the SIRI model where v has more than
one neighboring node.
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In the SIRI model, since v is the source node, X˜t(v, [1, t]) is independent of the states of other nodes.
Furthermore, for any pair of neighboring nodes u and u′ of v, the states of Tu(v;G) and Tu′(v;G) are
independent conditioned on the states of node v. Therefore, by applying Lemma A.1 to v and each of
its neighboring nodes, we have an infection path X˜t such that
Pv(Y
t+1)
Pv(X˜t)
=
Pv(Y
t+1(v, [1, t + 1]))
∏
u∈Nv(1)
Pv(Y
t+1(Tu(v;G), [1, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(v, [1, t]))
∏
u∈Nv(1)
Pv(X˜t(Tu(v;G), [1, t]))
≤
√
α
β
.
This completes the proof of claim (a) for the SIRI model. The proof of claim (a) for the SIR model is
similar to that of the SIRI model, and we omit it here to avoid repetition.
C. SIS model
For the SIS model, a node can become infected, recover, and then be reinfected again for multiple
times by the observation time. We characterize the time when a node is first infected (first infection
time) in the following lemma, whose proof is provided in Appendix G. Recall that Hv is the minimum
connected subgraph of G that contains Vi and v.
Lemma A.2. Suppose that v ∈ V is the infection source and a non-empty set of infected nodes Vi is
observed. Suppose the infection follows the SIS model and Assumption 4 and 5 hold. Then, for any t ∈ Tv,
there exists a most likely infection path Xt for (v, t), such that, for any u ∈ Hv\{v}, the first infection
time tint(u) of u in Xt is given by
tint(u) = t− d¯(u, Tu(v;Hv)). (11)
Lemma A.2 enables us to calculate the first infection time of each node in Hv in a most likely infection
path under the SIS model. Moreover, it shows that given the elapsed time, a most likely infection path for
a node v is given by a path whose nodes “resist” the infection, and each node becomes infected only at the
latest possible time. Therefore, intuitively the most likely elapsed time tv should be as small as possible
to minimize the time that nodes “resist” the infection spreading, so as to maximize the probability of the
infection path.
Since t ∈ Tv, we have t ≥ d¯(v, Vi). For any u ∈ V (v, 1), from Lemma A.2, we have that the first
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infection time tint(u) of u in Y t+1 is given by
tint(u) = t+ 1− d¯(u, Tu(v;Hv))
≥ d¯(v, Vi) + 1− d¯(u, Tu(v;Hv))
≥ 2. (12)
We claim that Y t+1(v, 1) = i. Otherwise, v and all its neighboring nodes are not infected at time 1
because of (12). Because the infection can propagate at most 1 hop away from v at time 1, all nodes are
uninfected at time 1, and the infection propagation process stops. This contradicts the assumption that the
set of observed infected nodes Vi is non-empty. Then, following Lemma A.2, we can let X˜t(V, [1, t]) =
Y t+1(V, [2, t + 1]), yielding
Pv(Y
t+1)
Pv(X˜t)
=
Pv(Y
t+1(v, 1))Pv(Y
t+1(V (v, 1), 1))Pv(Y
t+1(V, [2, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(V, [1, t]))
=pi(1− ps)
|V (v,1)|
≤1.
This completes the proof of claim (a) for the SIS model.
It is easy to see that δ ≤ 1 for all considered infection spreading models and claim (b) now follows
from claim (a), and the proof of Proposition 1 is complete.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
We first review the following topological property shown in [10].
Lemma B.1. Suppose a non-empty set of infected nodes Vi is observed over G. For a pair of neighboring
nodes u and v, if d¯(v, Vi) < d¯(u, Vi), we have
(a) l ∈ Tv(u;Hv
⋃
Hu), for all l ∈ argmaxx∈Vi d(u, x); and
(b) d¯(v, Vi) = d¯(u, Vi)− 1, and there exists l ∈ Tv(u;Hv
⋃
Hu) such that d(v, l) = d¯(v, Vi).
To prove Proposition 2, it suffices to construct an infection path X˜tv with source node v, and show
that Pv(X˜tv ) ≥ Pu(Y tu). Let tint(v) be the first infection time of node v in the infection path Y tu with
source node u. We first show that tint(v) = 1. Since u is the infection source, the infection can propagate
at most tu− tint(v) hops away from node v within the subtree Tv(u;Hv
⋃
Hu). From Lemma B.1(b), if
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tint(v) > 1, we have tv = tu − 1 > tu − tint(v), a contradiction. Therefore, we must have tint(v) = 1
in the infection path Y tu .
For the SI, SIR and SIRI models, we let X˜tv (Tv(u;G), [1, tv ]) = Y tu(Tv(u;G), [2, tu]), yielding
Pu(Y
tu(Tv(u;G), [1, tu]))
Pv(X˜tv (Tv(u;G), [1, tv ]))
=
Pu(Y
tu(v, 1) = i)Pu(Y
tu(Tv(u;G), [2, tu]))
Pv(X˜tv (Tv(u;G), [1, tv ]))
= ps(v). (13)
Let X˜tv (u, 1) = i and u can be seen as the infection source of the subtree Tu(v;G) with the infection
starting at time 1. For the SI model, applying (9) twice, we have
Pu(Y
tu(Tu(v;G), [1, tu]))
Pv(X˜tv (Tu(v;G), [1, tv ]))
=
Pu(Y
tu(Tu(v;G), [1, tu]))
Pv(X˜tv (u, 1) = i)Pv(X˜tv (Tu(v;G), [2, tv ]))
≤
(1− α)2
ps(u)
. (14)
Multiplying (13) by (14), we obtain
Pu(Y
tu)
Pv(X˜tv )
≤
ps(v) · (1− α)
2
ps(u)
≤
β(1− α)2
α
≤ 1,
where the last inequality follows from (1).
For the SIR and SIRI models, applying Lemma A.1 twice to u and each of its neighboring nodes in
Tu(v;G), we have
Pu(Y
tu(Tu(v;G), [1, tu]))
Pv(X˜tv (Tu(v;G), [1, tv ]))
=
Pu(Y
tu(Tu(v;G), [1, tu]))
Pv(X˜tv (u, 1) = i)Pv(X˜tv (Tu(v;G), [2, tv ]))
≤
α
β · ps(u)
. (15)
Multiplying (13) by (15), we have
Pu(Y
tu)
Pv(X˜tv )
≤
ps(v)
β
·
α
ps(u)
≤ 1.
This completes the proof of Proposition 2 in the SI, SIR and SIRI models.
We next consider the SIS model. Following Lemma A.2, we have Y tu(V (u, 1)\{v}, 1) = s and we
can let X˜tv (V, [1, tv ]) = Y tu(V, [2, tu]). Moreover, following similar arguments as the worst case in (24),
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we have that Y tu(u, 1) 6= i, yielding
Pu(Y
tu)
Pv(X˜tv )
=
Pu(Y
tu(v, 1))Pu(Y
tu(u, 1))Pu(Y
tu(V (u, 1)\{v}, 1))Pu(Y
tu(V, [2, tu]))
Pv(X˜tv (V, [1, tv ]))
= ps(1 − pi)(1− ps)
|V (u,1)\{v}|
≤ 1.
This completes the proof of Proposition 2 in the SIS model. The proof of Proposition 2 is now complete.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
We extend the notation of subtree as follows. For any graph A, any node v ∈ A and a set of nodes
S ⊂ A, let Tv(S;A) be the subtree of A rooted at node v with the first link in the path from v to each
element in S removed. Moreover, for any set of nodes M ⊂ A, let TM (S;A) =
⋃
v∈M Tv(S;A).
For any t ∈ TS , consider any most likely infection path Y t+1 for (S, t + 1). To show claim (a), it
suffices to construct an infection path X˜t for (S, t) such that
PS(Y
t+1) ≤ PS(X˜
t). (16)
We start with the case where k = 2 and show (16) by mathematical induction on d(s1, s2).
Basis step (i): The inequality (16) holds for d(s1, s2) = 1.
The states of Ts1(S;G) and Ts2(S;G) are independent. We can treat s1 and s2 as the infection source
of Ts1(S;G) and Ts2(S;G), respectively. Then following Proposition 1, we can find a X˜t such that
PS(Y
t+1)
PS(X˜t)
=
PS(Y
t+1(Ts1(S;G), [1, t + 1]))
PS(X˜t(Ts1(S;G), [1, t]))
PS(Y
t+1(Ts2(S;G), [1, t + 1]))
PS(X˜t(Ts2(S;G), [1, t]))
≤ 1.
Basis step (ii): The inequality (16) holds for d(s1, s2) = 2.
Denote the common neighboring node of s1 and s2 to be u. Consider the following two possible cases
of Y t+1.
Case 1: Y t+1(u, 1) = i.
We let X˜t(u, 1) = i, conditioning on which the states of Ts1(S;G), Ts2(S;G) and Tu(S;G) are
independent. Moreover, u can be seen as the infection source of Tu(S;G) with the infection starting at
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time 1. Then following Proposition 1, we can find a X˜t such that
PS(Y
t+1)
PS(X˜t)
=
PS(Y
t+1(Ts1(S;G), [1, t + 1]))
PS(X˜t(Ts1(S;G), [1, t]))
PS(Y
t+1(Ts2(S;G), [1, t + 1]))
PS(X˜t(Ts2(S;G), [1, t]))
PS(Y
t+1(u, 1))
PS(X˜t(u, 1))
PS(Y
t+1(Tu(S;G), [2, t + 1]))
PS(X˜t(Tu(S;G), [2, t]))
≤ 1.
Case 2: Y t+1(u, 1) = s.
We let X˜t(Tu(S;G), [1, t]) = Y t+1(Tu(S;G), [2, t+1]). Then following Proposition 1, we can find a
X˜t such that
PS(Y
t+1)
PS(X˜t)
=
PS(Y
t+1(Ts1(S;G), [1, t + 1]))
PS(X˜t(Ts1(S;G), [1, t]))
PS(Y
t+1(Ts2(S;G), [1, t + 1]))
PS(X˜t(Ts2(S;G), [1, t]))
PS(Y
t+1(u, 1))PS(Y
t+1(Tu(S;G), [2, t + 1]))
PS(X˜t(Tu(S;G), [1, t]))
≤ 1− ps(u)
≤ 1.
Inductive step: If (16) holds for d(s1, s2) ≤ n, then (16) also holds for d(s1, s2) = n+1, where n ≥ 2.
Let ρ(v, u) be the path between two nodes v and u. Denote the neighboring node of s1 and s2 in
ρ(s1, s2) to be u1 and u2, respectively. Consider the following four possible cases of Y t+1.
Case 1: Y t+1(u1, 1) = i and Y t+1(u2, 1) = i.
We let X˜t(u1, 1) = i and X˜t(u2, 1) = i. Then u1 and u2 can be seen as the pair of infection sources of
Tρ(u1,u2)(S;G) with the infection starting at time 1. Moreover, we have d(u1, u2) = d(s1, s2)−2 = n−1.
Then by induction assumption, we can find a X˜t such that
PS(Y
t+1(Tρ(u1,u2)(S;G), [2, t + 1])) ≤ PS(X˜
t(Tρ(u1,u2)(S;G), [2, t])).
Then by Proposition 1, we can find a X˜t such that (16) holds.
Case 2: Y t+1(u1, 1) = i and Y t+1(u2, 1) = s.
We let X˜t(u1, 1) = i and X˜t(u2, 1) = s. Then u1 and s2 can be seen as the pair of infection sources of
Tρ(u1,u2)
⋃
{s2} with the infection starting at time 1. Moreover, we have d(u1, u2) = d(s1, s2)−2 = n−1.
Then by induction assumption, we can find a X˜t such that
PS(Y
t+1(Tρ(u1,u2)(S;G), [2, t + 1])) ≤ PS(X˜
t(Tρ(u1,u2)(S;G), [2, t])).
Then by Proposition 1, we can find a X˜t such that (16) holds.
Case 3: Y t+1(u1, 1) = s and Y t+1(u2, 1) = i.
Following similar arguments as that in Case 2, we can find a X˜t such that (16) holds.
35
Case 4: Y t+1(u1, 1) = s and Y t+1(u2, 1) = s.
We let X˜t(Tρ(u1,u2)(S;G), [1, t]) = Y t+1(Tρ(u1,u2)(S;G), [2, t+1]). Then following Proposition 1, we
can find a X˜t such that
PS(Y
t+1)
PS(X˜t)
=
PS(Y
t+1(Ts1(S;G), [1, t + 1]))
PS(X˜t(Ts1(S;G), [1, t]))
PS(Y
t+1(Ts2(S;G), [1, t + 1]))
PS(X˜t(Ts2(S;G), [1, t]))
PS(Y
t+1(u1, 1))PS(Y
t+1(u2, 1))PS(Y
t+1(Tρ(u1,u2)(S;G), [2, t + 1]))
PS(X˜t(Tρ(u1,u2)(S;G), [1, t]))
≤ (1− ps(u1))(1 − ps(u2))
≤ 1.
This completes the proof for the inductive step. By the spirit of mathematical induction, we have shown
that (16) holds for k = 2. When k > 2, similar arguments can be applied to each pair of source nodes,
and this completes the proof of claim (a).
We show that TS = [d¯(S, Vi),+∞). Consider any node l ∈ Vi such that d(S, l) = d¯(S, Vi). The
infection can propagate at most one hop further from any source node in one time slot. If t < d¯(S, Vi),
the infection can not reach node l. Claim (b) now follows from claim (a), and the proof of Proposition
3 is complete.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
We first show that the value of the minimum infection range in G˜(S,Xt) can not be less than d¯(S, Vi).
Assume there is a super node Supernode(S′) in G˜(S,Xt) that is associated with a set of k nodes S′ ⊂ V
such that, d¯(Supernode(S′), Vi) < d¯(S, Vi). Then it is implied that d¯(S′, Vi) < d¯(S, Vi), which contradicts
with the assumption that S is a k-Jordan center set.
We then show that Supernode(S) is a Jordan center of Vi in the transformed super node graph G˜(S,Xt),
i.e., Supernode(S) has the minimum infection range in G˜(S,Xt). In other words, we want to show
that d(Supernode(S), v) ≤ d¯(S, Vi) for any node v ∈ Vi. From Definition 5, it suffices to show that
d(si, v) ≤ d¯(S, Vi) for any node v ∈ Ai, where i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k}. Suppose that there exists a node v ∈ Ai
such that d(si, v) ≥ d¯(S, Vi) + 1. Then the first infection time tint(v) of v in XtS is
tint(v) ≥ d(si, v)
≥ d¯(S, Vi) + 1,
because the infection can spread at most one hop further from si in one time slot. Following Proposition
3(b), we have that tS = d¯(S, Vi) < tint(v), a contradiction. Therefore we have d(si, v) ≤ d¯(S, Vi) for
any v ∈ Ai, where i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k}. This competes the proof of Lemma 2.
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APPENDIX E
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4
For a node u ∈ Vi, suppose that sˆl−1j is a nearest node in Sˆl−1 to u, and Mj be the Voronoi set
corresponding to sˆl−1j . Following Definition 4, it suffices to show that
d(sˆlj , u) ≤ d¯(Sˆ
l−1, Vi),
where sˆlj is the Jordan center of Mj . We have d(sˆlj , u) ≤ maxz∈Vi∩Mj d(sˆlj , z) ≤ maxz∈Vi∩Mj d(sˆ
l−1
j , z) ≤
d¯(Sˆl−1, Vi). The proof of Proposition 4 is now complete.
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF LEMMA A.1
We first show the following property of the SIRI model in a network with only one node.
Lemma F.1. Suppose that G has only one node v. For any t ∈ [1,+∞), consider any two most likely
infection paths Xt for (v, t) and Y t+1 for (v, t+1) under the SIRI model. Assume Assumption 3 holds.
We have
Pv(Y
t+1)
Pv(Xt)
≤
√
α
β
. (17)
Proof: Given any most likely infection path Y t+1 for (v, t + 1) with t ∈ [1,+∞), it suffices to
construct another infection path X˜t for (v, t) such that
Pv(Y
t+1)
Pv(X˜t)
≤
√
α
β
. (18)
Let X˜t(v, [1, t]) = Y t+1(v, [2, t + 1]), we have three cases for Y t+1 which are discussed in the
following.
Case 1: If Y t+1(v, 1) = i, we have
Pv(Y
t+1)
Pv(X˜t)
=
Pv(Y
t+1(v, 1))Pv(Y
t+1(v, [2, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(v, [1, t]))
= pi(v)
≤
√
α
β
,
where the last inequality holds from (3).
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Case 2: If Y t+1(v, 1) = r and Y t+1(v, 2) = i, we have
Pv(Y
t+1)
Pv(X˜t)
=
Pv(Y
t+1(v, [1, 2]))Pv (Y
t+1(v, [3, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(v, 1))Pv(X˜t(v, [2, t]))
=
(1− pi(v))pr(v)
pi(v)
≤
√
α
β
,
where the last inequality holds from (4).
Case 3: If Y t+1(v, 1) = r and Y t+1(v, 2) = r, we have
Pv(Y
t+1)
Pv(X˜t)
=
Pv(Y
t+1(v, [1, 2]))Pv (Y
t+1(v, [3, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(v, 1))Pv(X˜t(v, [2, t]))
=
(1− pi(v))(1 − pr(v))
1− pi(v)
≤
√
α
β
,
where the last inequality holds from (4).
We see that (18) holds for all three possible cases. The proof for Lemma F.1 is now complete.
We note that Tu(v;G) is either an uninfected subtree or infected subtree. In the following, we prove
these two cases separately.
A. Proof of Lemma A.1 for Uninfected Subtree
If Tu(v;G) is an uninfected subtree, we can easily see that Tv = [1,+∞). It is clear that claim (c)
follows from claim (a) and (b). In the following, we prove claim (a) and (b) by mathematical induction
on the elapsed time t.
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1 2
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Fig. 11. Illustration of four possible cases for Y 2, where we omit the states for any node that only have non-susceptible state.
We have Y 2(v, [1, 2]) = pi(v)2, (1− pi(v))pr(v), pi(v)2, or (1− pi(v))pr(v) for four cases respectively. Moreover, we have
X2(Tu(v;G), [1, 2]) = (1−ps(u))
2
, 1−ps(u), ps(u)(1−pi(u))
∏
w∈ch(u)(1−ps(w)), or ps(u)(1−pi(u))
∏
w∈ch(u)(1−ps(w))
for four cases respectively.
Basis step: t = 1.
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If v ∈ Vi, we let X˜1(v, 1) = i and X˜1(u, 1) = s, then Pv(X˜1(v, 1)) = pi(v) and Pv(X˜1(Tu(v;G), 1)) =
Pv(X˜
1(u, 1)) = 1 − ps(u). As shown in Figure 11, there are four possible cases for Y 2. Following
Assumption 5, we have
ps(u)(1 − pi(u))
∏
w∈ch(u)(1− ps(w))
1− ps(u)
≤
(1− pi(u))(1 − α)
1− β
≤ 1, (19)
where the last inequity holds from (3). Then following (3), (4) and (19), we have
Pv(Y
2(v, [1, 2]))
Pv(X˜1(v, 1))
=
max
{
pi(v)
2, (1− pi(v))pr(v)
}
pi(v)
≤
√
α
β
,
Pv(Y
2(Tu(v;G), [1, 2]))
Pv(X˜1(Tu(v;G), 1))
=
max
{
(1− ps(u))
2, 1− ps(u), ps(u)(1 − pi(u))
∏
w∈ch(u)(1− ps(w))
}
1− ps(u)
= 1.
If v /∈ Vi, we have X˜1(v, 1) = r and X˜1(u, 1) = n, then Pv(X˜1(v, 1)) = 1−pi(v) and Pv(X˜1(Tu(v;G), 1)) =
Pv(X˜
1(u, 1)) = 1 − ps(u). Change the states of node v at time slot 2 for all four cases in Figure 11
from infected to recovered. Then following (3), (4) and (19), we have
Pv(Y
2(v, [1, 2]))
Pv(X˜1(v, 1))
=
max {pi(v)(1 − pi(v)), (1 − pi(v))(1 − pr(v))}
1− pi(v)
,
≤
√
α
β
,
Pv(Y
2(Tu(v;G), [1, 2]))
Pv(X˜1(Tu(v;G), 1))
=
max
{
1− ps(u), ps(u)(1 − pi(u))
∏
w∈ch(u)(1− ps(w))
}
1− ps(u)
= 1.
This completes the proof for the basis step.
Inductive step: assume claim (a) and (b) hold for t = τ − 1, where τ ≥ 2. We want to show that claim
(a) and (b) also hold for t = τ .
Assume t = τ and consider the following six possible cases for Y t+1.
Case 1: Y t+1(v, 1) = i and Y t+1(u, 1) = s.
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Let X˜t(V, [1, t]) = Y t+1(V, [2, t + 1]). Then following (3), we have
Pv(Y
t+1(v, [1, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(v, [1, t]))
=
Pv(Y
t+1(v, 1) = i)Pv(Y
t+1(v, [2, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(v, [1, t]))
= pi(v)
≤
√
α
β
,
Pv(Y
t+1(Tu(v;G), [1, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(Tu(v;G), [1, t]))
=
Pv(Y
t+1(u, 1) = s)Pv(Y
t+1(Tu(v;G), [2, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(Tu(v;G), [1, t]))
= 1− ps(u)
≤ 1.
Case 2: Y t+1(v, 1) = i and Y t+1(u, 1) = i.
Let X˜t(v, [1, t]) = Y t+1(v, [2, t+ 1]) and X˜t(u, 1) = i. In this case, the states of v do not depend on
the states of any other nodes, therefore, it can be seen as the infection source of a graph containing only
itself with the infection starting at time 1. Then by Lemma F.1, we can find a X˜t such that
Pv(Y
t+1(v, [2, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(v, [2, t]))
≤
√
α
β
.
We then have
Pv(Y
t+1(v, [1, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(v, [1, t]))
=
Pv(Y
t+1(v, 1) = i)Pv(Y
t+1(v, [2, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(v, 1) = i)Pv(X˜t(v, [2, t]))
≤
√
α
β
.
After it gets infected at time 1, node u serves as the infection source of Tu(v;G) with the infection
starting at time 1. By the induction assumption, we can find a X˜t such that
Pv(Y
t+1(Tu(v;G), [2, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(Tu(v;G), [2, t]))
≤
√
α
β
≤ 1.
The following inequality then holds,
Pv(Y
t+1(Tu(v;G), [1, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(Tu(v;G), [1, t]))
=
Pv(Y
t+1(u, 1) = i)Pv(Y
t+1(Tu(v;G), [2, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(u, 1) = i)Pv(X˜t(Tu(v;G), [2, t])
≤ 1.
Case 3: Y t+1(v, 1) = r, Y t+1(v, 2) = i and Y t+1(u, 1) = n.
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Let X˜t(V, [1, t]) = Y t+1(V, [2, t + 1]). Following (4), we have
Pv(Y
t+1(v, [1, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(v, [1, t]))
=
Pv(Y
t+1(v, 1) = r)Pv(Y
t+1(v, 2) = i)Pv(Y
t+1(v, [3, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(v, 1) = i)Pv(X˜t(v, [2, t])
=
(1− pi(v))pr(v)
pi(v)
≤
√
α
β
,
Pv(Y
t+1(Tu(v;G), [1, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(Tu(v;G), [1, t]))
=
Pv(Y
t+1(u, 1) = n)Pv(Y
t+1(u, 2) = s)Pv(Y
t+1(Tu(v;G), [3, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(u, 1) = s)Pv(X˜t(Tu(v;G), [2, t])
= 1.
Case 4: Y t+1(v, 1) = r, Y t+1(v, 2) = i and Y t+1(u, 1) = i.
Let X˜t(v, [1, t]) = Y t+1(v, [2, t + 1]) and X˜t(u, 1) = i. Following (4), we have
Pv(Y
t+1(v, [1, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(v, [1, t]))
=
Pv(Y
t+1(v, 1) = r)Pv(Y
t+1(v, 2) = i)Pv(Y
t+1(v, [3, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(v, 1) = i)Pv(X˜t(v, [2, t]))
=
(1− pi(v))pr(v)
pi(v)
≤
√
α
β
.
Following the same arguments as that in case 2, we can find a X˜t such that
Pv(Y
t+1(Tu(v;G), [1, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(Tu(v;G), [1, t]))
=
Pv(Y
t+1(u, 1) = i)Pv(Y
t+1(Tu(v;G), [2, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(u, 1) = i)Pv(X˜t(Tu(v;G), [2, t]))
≤ 1.
Case 5: Y t+1(v, 1) = r, Y t+1(v, 2) = r and Y t+1(u, 1) = n.
Let X˜t(V, [1, t]) = Y t+1(V, [2, t + 1]). Following (4), we have
Pv(Y
t+1(v, [1, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(v, [1, t]))
=
Pv(Y
t+1(v, 1) = r)Pv(Y
t+1(v, 2) = r)Pv(Y
t+1(v, [3, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(v, 1) = r)Pv(X˜t(v, [2, t]))
=
(1− pi(v))(1 − pr(v))
1− pi(v)
≤
√
α
β
,
Pv(Y
t+1(Tu(v;G), [1, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(Tu(v;G), [1, t]))
=
Pv(Y
t+1(u, 1) = n)Pv(Y
t+1(u, 2) = n)Pv(Y
t+1(Tu(v;G), [3, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(u, 1) = n)Pv(X˜t(Tu(v;G), [2, t]))
= 1.
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Case 6: Y t+1(v, 1) = r, Y t+1(v, 2) = r and Y t+1(u, 1) = i.
Let X˜t(v, [1, t]) = Y t+1(v, [2, t+ 1]) and X˜t(u, 1) = i. Following the same arguments as that in case
2, we can find a X˜t such that
Pv(Y
t+1(Tu(v;G), [2, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(Tu(v;G), [2, t]))
≤ 1.
Then following (4), we have
Pv(Y
t+1(v, [1, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(v, [1, t]))
=
Pv(Y
t+1(v, 1) = r)Pv(Y
t+1(v, 2) = r)Pv(Y
t+1(v, [3, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(v, 1) = r)Pv(X˜t(v, [2, t]))
=
(1− pi(v))(1 − pr(v))
1− pi(v)
≤
√
α
β
,
Pv(Y
t+1(Tu(v;G), [1, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(Tu(v;G), [1, t]))
=
Pv(Y
t+1(u, 1) = i)Pv(Y
t+1(Tu(v;G), [2, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(u, 1) = i)Pv(X˜t(Tu(v;G), [2, t]))
≤ 1.
Therefore, we have shown that claim (a) and (b) hold for all six possible cases. This completes the
proof for the inductive step. The proof of Lemma A.1 for uninfected subtree is now complete.
B. Proof of Lemma A.1 for Infected Subtree
If Tu(v;G) is an infected subtree, we can see that Tv = [d¯(v, Vi),+∞). We prove claim (a) and (b)
for infected subtree by mathematical induction on d¯(v, Vi).
Basis step: d¯(v, Vi) = 1.
For any t ≥ 1, we consider any most likely infection path Y t+1 for (v, t + 1). In the following, six
possible cases for Y t+1 are discussed in order.
Case 1: Y t+1(v, 1) = i and Y t+1(u, 1) = s.
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Let X˜t(V, [1, t]) = Y t+1(V, [2, t + 1]). Then following (3), we have
Pv(Y
t+1(v, [1, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(v, [1, t]))
=
Pv(Y
t+1(v, 1) = i)Pv(Y
t+1(v, [2, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(v, [1, t]))
= pi(v)
≤
√
α
β
,
Pv(Y
t+1(Tu(v;G), [1, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(Tu(v;G), [1, t]))
=
Pv(Y
t+1(u, 1) = s)Pv(Y
t+1(Tu(v;G), [2, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(Tu(v;G), [1, t]))
= 1− ps(u)
≤ 1.
Case 2: Y t+1(v, 1) = i and Y t+1(u, 1) = i.
Let X˜t(v, [1, t]) = Y t+1(v, [2, t + 1]) and X˜t(u, 1) = i, following (3), we have
Pv(Y
t+1(v, [1, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(v, [1, t]))
=
Pv(Y
t+1(v, 1) = i)Pv(Y
t+1(v, [2, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(v, [1, t]))
= pi(v)
≤
√
α
β
.
After it gets infected at time slot 1, node u serves as the infection source of the subtree Tu(v;G)
with the infection starting at time 1. From the assumption d¯(v, Vi) = 1, it follows that Tw(u;G) is an
uninfected subtree for any w ∈ V (u, 1)
⋂
Tu(v;G). Then by Lemma A.1(c) for uninfected subtree, we
can find a X˜t such that
Pv(Y
t+1(Tu(v;G), [2, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(Tu(v;G), [2, t]))
≤
√
α
β
≤ 1. (20)
We then have,
Pv(Y
t+1(Tu(v;G), [1, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(Tu(v;G), [1, t]))
=
Pv(Y
t+1(u, 1) = i)Pv(Y
t+1(Tu(v;G), [2, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(u, 1) = i)Pv(X˜t(Tu(v;G), [2, t]))
≤ 1.
Case 3: Y t+1(v, 1) = r, Y t+1(v, 2) = i and Y t+1(u, 1) = n.
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Let X˜t(V, [1, t]) = Y t+1(V, [2, t + 1]). Following (4), we have
Pv(Y
t+1(v, [1, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(v, [1, t]))
=
Pv(Y
t+1(v, 1) = r)Pv(Y
t+1(v, 2) = i)Pv(Y
t+1(v, [3, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(v, 1) = i)Pv(X˜t(v, [2, t])
=
(1− pi(v))pr(v)
pi(v)
≤
√
α
β
,
Pv(Y
t+1(Tu(v;G), [1, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(Tu(v;G), [1, t]))
=
Pv(Y
t+1(u, 1) = n)Pv(Y
t+1(u, 2) = s)Pv(Y
t+1(Tu(v;G), [3, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(u, 1) = s)Pv(X˜t(Tu(v;G), [2, t])
= 1.
Case 4: Y t+1(v, 1) = r, Y t+1(v, 2) = i and Y t+1(u, 1) = i.
Let X˜t(v, [1, t]) = Y t+1(v, [2, t+ 1]) and X˜t(u, 1) = i. Following the same arguments as that in case
2, we can find a X˜t such that (20) holds. Then following (4), we have
Pv(Y
t+1(v, [1, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(v, [1, t]))
=
Pv(Y
t+1(v, 1) = r)Pv(Y
t+1(v, 2) = i)Pv(Y
t+1(v, [3, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(v, 1) = i)Pv(X˜t(v, [2, t]))
=
(1− pi(v))pr(v)
pi(v)
≤
√
α
β
,
Pv(Y
t+1(Tu(v;G), [1, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(Tu(v;G), [1, t]))
=
Pv(Y
t+1(u, 1) = i)Pv(Y
t+1(Tu(v;G), [2, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(u, 1) = i)Pv(X˜t(Tu(v;G), [2, t]))
≤ 1.
Case 5: Y t+1(v, 1) = r, Y t+1(v, 2) = r and Y t+1(u, 1) = n.
Let X˜t(V, [1, t]) = Y t+1(V, [2, t + 1]). Then following (4), we have
Pv(Y
t+1(v, [1, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(v, [1, t]))
=
Pv(Y
t+1(v, 1) = r)Pv(Y
t+1(v, 2) = r)Pv(Y
t+1(v, [3, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(v, 1) = r)Pv(X˜t(v, [2, t]))
=
(1− pi(v))(1 − pr(v))
1− pi(v)
≤
√
α
β
,
Pv(Y
t+1(Tu(v;G), [1, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(Tu(v;G), [1, t]))
=
Pv(Y
t+1(u, 1) = n)Pv(Y
t+1(u, 2) = n)Pv(Y
t+1(Tu(v;G), [3, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(u, 1) = n)Pv(X˜t(Tu(v;G), [2, t]))
= 1.
Case 6: Y t+1(v, 1) = r, Y t+1(v, 2) = r and Y t+1(u, 1) = i.
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Let X˜t(v, [1, t]) = Y t+1(v, [2, t+ 1]) and X˜t(u, 1) = i. Following the same arguments as that in case
2, we can find a X˜t such that (20) holds. Then following (4), we have
Pv(Y
t+1(v, [1, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(v, [1, t]))
=
Pv(Y
t+1(v, 1) = r)Pv(Y
t+1(v, 2) = r)Pv(Y
t+1(v, [3, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(v, 1) = r)Pv(X˜t(v, [2, t]))
=
(1− pi(v))(1 − pr(v))
1− pi(v)
≤
√
α
β
,
Pv(Y
t+1(Tu(v;G), [1, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(Tu(v;G), [1, t]))
=
Pv(Y
t+1(u, 1) = i)Pv(Y
t+1(Tu(v;G), [2, t + 1]))
Pv(X˜t(u, 1) = i)Pv(X˜t(Tu(v;G), [2, t]))
≤ 1.
We have shown that claim (a) and (b) hold for all six possible cases. This completes the proof for the
basis step.
Inductive step: assume claim (a) and (b) hold for d¯(v, Vi) ≤ n− 1, where n ≥ 2. We want to show that
claim (a) and (b) also hold for d¯(v, Vi) = n.
Assume d¯(v, Vi) = n and consider any most likely infection path Y t+1 for (v, t+1), where t ≥ n. We
first show that (20) in case 2 also holds in the inductive step. For case 2, we have Y t+1(v, 1) = i and
Y t+1(u, 1) = i. Let X˜t(v, [1, t]) = Y t+1(v, [2, t+1]) and X˜t(u, 1) = i, after it gets infected at time slot
1, node u will serve as the infection source of the subtree Tu(v;G) with the infection starting at time
1. Since d¯(u, Vi
⋂
Tu(v;G)) ≤ n − 1, from the induction assumption, we can find a X˜t such that (20)
holds. From the same arguments as that in the basis step, it follows that claim (a) and (b) hold for all six
possible cases. This completes the proof for the inductive step. By the spirit of mathematical induction,
the proof of Lemma A.1 for infected subtree is now complete. This completes the proof of Lemma A.1.
APPENDIX G
PROOF OF LEMMA A.2
Let d be the degree of any node in G. Fix the elapsed time to be t and consider any most likely
infection path Xt for (v, t). Given any u ∈ Hv\{v}, we first show that
tint(u) ∈ [d(v, u), t − d¯(u, Tu(v;Hv))]. (21)
Firstly, it is easy to see that any node in Hv has been infected at least once due to the assumption that
the underlying network G is a tree, otherwise, the infection can not reach the leaf nodes of Hv. We now
consider the lower bound of tint(u) in (21). Since the infection can spread at most one hop away from
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v in each time slot, the earliest time for u to get the infection is d(v, u). Then we consider the upper
bound of tint(u) in (21). After node u gets infected for the first time at tint(u), the infection can spread
at most t− tint(u) hops away from u. Consider a node w such that d(u,w) = d¯(u, Tu(v;Hv)). In order
for the infection to reach node w, t− tint(u) ≥ d(u,w). So tint(u) ≤ t− d(u,w) = t− d¯(u, Tu(v;Hv)).
The proof for (21) is now complete.
Suppose that there exists a node u ∈ Hv\{v} such that the first infection time tint(u) of u in Xt
is less than t − d¯(u, Tu(v;Hv)). To prove Lemma A.2, following (21), it suffices to show that we can
construct another infection path X˜t for (v, t) that occurs with at least the same probability as Xt, where
the first infection time of u in X˜t is t˜(u) = t− d¯(u, Tu(v;Hv)).
We let the states of G\(Tu(v;G)
⋃
{pa(u)}) in X˜t to be the same as those in Xt, i.e.
X˜t(G\(Tu(v;G)
⋃
{pa(u)}), [1, t]) = Xt(G\(Tu(v;G)
⋃
{pa(u)}), [1, t]).
Let X˜t(pa(u), [1, tint(u)−1]) = Xt(pa(u), [1, tint(u)−1]) and A = Tu(v;G)
⋃
{pa(u)}
⋃
V (pa(u), 1).
It suffices to show that
(22)Pv(X˜t(A, [tint(u), t])) ≥ Pv(Xt(A, [tint(u), t])).
We show (22) by mathematical induction on d¯(u, Tu(v;Hv)).
Basis step: show (22) holds for d¯(u, Tu(v;Hv)) = 0.
Let B denote the set of nodes V (pa(u), 1)\{u}. Consider a time slot τ < t˜(u) where X˜t(pa(u), τ) = i.
We show the worst case for X˜t at time τ + 1.
If Xt(pa(u), τ) = i, we have
Pv(X˜
t(B, τ + 1)) = Pv(X
t(B, τ + 1). (23)
If Xt(pa(u), τ) 6= i, we have
Pv(X˜
t(B, τ + 1))
Pv(Xt(B, τ + 1)
≥ (1− ps)
d−1, (24)
where the equality holds when every node in B is susceptible in X˜t and non-susceptible in Xt at time
τ . By (23) and (24), we can see that the worst case for X˜t at time τ + 1 is that Xt(pa(u), τ) 6= i and
Xt(B, τ) = n.
We divide the time interval [tint(u), t] into three parts: tint(u), [tint(u) + 1, t˜(u)− 1] and t˜(u), where
t˜(u) = t− d¯(u, Tu(v;Hv)) = t.
Part 1: time τ = tint(u).
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Since node u is infected for the first time at time slot tint(u) in Xt, we know that node pa(u) must
be infected at time tint(u) − 1, which in turn suggests that X˜t(pa(u), τ − 1) = Xt(pa(u), τ − 1) = i,
yielding
Pv(X˜
t(B, τ)) = Pv(X
t(B, τ)). (25)
We let X˜t(pa(u), τ) = i and consider the worst case in (24). Following (5) and (25), we have
Pv(X˜
t(A, tint(u)))
Pv(Xt(A, tint(u)))
=
Pv(X˜
t(pa(u), tint(u)))Pv(X˜
t(u, tint(u)))Pv(X˜
t(B, tint(u)))
Pv(Xt(pa(u), tint(u)))Pv(Xt(u, tint(u)))Pv(Xt(B, tint(u)))
≥
pi(1− ps)
(1− pi)ps
(26)
≥ 1. (27)
Part 2: time τ ∈ [tint(u) + 1, t− 1].
We first consider the case that at least one node in Tu(v;G) is infected at time τ . We let X˜t(pa(u), τ) =
i and consider the worst case, i.e., Xt(pa(u), τ − 1) 6= i and Xt(B, τ − 1) = n. We then have
Pv(X˜
t(A, τ)) ≥ pi(1− ps)
d.
Since Xt(pa(u), τ − 1) 6= i and at least one node in Tu(v;G) is infected at time τ , there must exist a
node w ∈ Tu(v;G), s.t., Xt(w, τ − 1) = i. Consider any neighboring node z of w. If Xt(z, τ − 1) = i,
due to the fact that Xt(pa(u), τ − 1) 6= i and the assumption that G is an infinite tree, we can always
find a node y ∈ Tz(w;G)
⋂
(Tu(v;G)
⋃
{pa(u)}), s.t., Xt(y, τ − 1) = s. If Xt(z, τ − 1) = s, following
similar arguments as the worst case in (24), we can see that Xt(z, τ) 6= i. We then have
Pv(X
t(Tz(w;G)
⋂
(Tu(v;G)
⋃
{pa(u)}), τ)) ≤ 1− ps,
for any neighboring node z of w. Moreover, we have at least one node in Tu(v;G) being infected at
time τ , yielding
Pv(X
t(A, τ)) ≤ max{pi, ps}(1 − ps)
d
= pi(1− ps)
d
≤ Pv(X˜
t(A, τ)). (28)
We then consider the case that no node in Tu(v;G) is infected at time τ . Without loss of generality,
we assume τ is the earliest time after tint(u) that no node in Tu(v;G) is infected. We let X˜(pa(u), τ) =
Xt(pa(u), τ) and consider the worst case for X˜t(pa(u), τ). If Xt(pa(u), τ) = i, we have
Pv(X˜
t(A, τ))
Pv(Xt(A, τ))
≥
pi(1− ps)
d
ps(1− pi)(1− ps)d−1
≥ 1. (29)
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If Xt(pa(u), τ) 6= i, we have
Pv(X˜
t(A, τ))
Pv(Xt(A, τ))
≥
(1− pi)(1− ps)
d
(1− ps)(1− pi)(1 − ps)d−1
= 1. (30)
From (28)-(30), we have
Pv(X˜
t(A, [tint(u) + 1, τ ])) ≥ Pv(X
t(A, [tint(u) + 1, τ ])). (31)
We have now X˜t(V, τ) = Xt(V, τ). If there are other time slots after τ that no node in Tu(v;G) is
infected, we can apply the same arguments again. Then by (28) and (31), we have
Pv(X˜
t(A, [tint(u) + 1, t− 1])) ≥ Pv(X
t(A, [tint(u) + 1, t− 1])). (32)
Part 3: time τ = t.
If pa(u) ∈ Vi, we have
Pv(X˜
t(A, t))
Pv(Xt(A, t))
≥
pips(1− ps)
d−1
pspi(1− ps)d−1
= 1. (33)
Then (22) holds from (27), (32) and (33).
If pa(u) /∈ Vi, we have
Pv(X˜
t(A, t))
Pv(Xt(A, t))
≥
(1− pi)ps(1− ps)
d−1
(1− ps)pi(1− ps)d−1
=
(1− pi)ps
pi(1− ps)
. (34)
Then (22) holds from (26), (32) and (34). This competes the proof of the basis step.
Inductive step: assume (22) holds for d¯(u, Tu(v;Hv)) ≤ n, where 0 ≤ n ≤ d¯(v,Hv) − 1. Show (22)
also holds for d¯(u, Tu(v;Hv)) = n+ 1.
We divide the time interval [tint(u), t] into four parts: tint(u), [tint(u)+1, t˜(u)−1], t˜(u) and [t˜(u)+1, t],
where t˜(u) = t−d¯(u, Tu(v;Hv)). For any node w ∈ ch(u), we have d¯(w, Tw(v;Hv)) ≤ d¯(u, Tu(v;Hv))−
1 = n. By induction assumption, we have that node w get infected for the first time at t(w) = t −
d¯(w, Tw(v;Hv)) in Xt, which in turn suggests that Xt(u, t˜(u)) = i. For the time range [t˜(u) + 1, t], we
let X˜t(A, [t˜(u) + 1, t]) = Xt(A, [t˜(u) + 1, t]), yielding
Pv(X˜
t(A, [t˜(u) + 1, t])) = Pv(X
t(A, [t˜(u) + 1, t])).
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For the first three parts, following similar arguments as in the basis step, we have
Pv(X˜
t(A, [tint(u) + 1, t˜(u)])) ≥ Pv(X
t(A, [tint(u) + 1, t˜(u)])).
We can now conclude that (22) holds for the inductive step. By the spirit of mathematical induction,
(22) holds and the proof of Lemma A.2 is now complete.
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